Tuesday, April 15, 2025

Do the math

From Congressional Research Service: "Introduction to U.S. Economy: Inflation" dated April 1, 2025

From page 2 of 3:


 

The link turned up as part of the AI Overview in Google Search results. The AI Overview response itself provides a different calculation:

To convert a nominal value to a real value, you need to adjust for inflation using a price index. The formula is: Real Value = Nominal Value / (Price Index / 100).

 

To remove inflation from nominal values, you divide it out of the nominals. The CRS would have us multiply inflation in ...

An April Fools gag? New Trump policy?? Pure ignorance??? Hard to say.

Sunday, April 13, 2025

Engineering a depression

"The Trump Depression" by Robert Kuttner, 5 March 2025, at The American Prospect. The subtitle says "Donald Trump is on track to be the first president to deliberately engineer a severe depression." That was the first reference I found to Trump creating a depression. The statement is clear and, I think, correct. The goal is depression, and the intent deliberate.

The second reference to depression that I saw was S2E8 of "Have I Got News for You". About 8:50 into the video, Roy Wood Jr asks "What happens of Trump's tariffs don't work and America ends up in a depression?" And again, about 9:14 into the video, Roy Wood Jr asks: "If the depression hurricane is off shore, how close is it to landfall?" It is a comedy show, but Roy Wood Jr was expressing honest concern.

Don't fast-forward to the depression quotes. Watch the show, it's so funny. It's my new favorite show.

The third reference to depression is from "Smerconish" on CNN. Season 2025, the 12 April episode. At the end of the episode he shows a cartoon of Trump wearing a hat that says "Make America 1929 Again". It's perfect.

I'm glad the topic comes up once in a while because if we are going to have a depression, it is best not to be caught by surprise. Anyway, these things take time to develop. And if people believe Trump is creating a depression and react negatively, there is time to change course. Of course, the reaction to Trump's policy would have to be strong and severe.


In the American Prospect article, Kuttner asks: "What in the hell does Trump think he is accomplishing?"

It's a good question. I have been waiting, focusing on the news, trying to understand what Trump's plan is, trying to understand how "tariffs" and "Greenland" and "bullying" and all the other pieces of his plan fit together. It finally struck me about two days ago: He's creating a depression. Thank you, Mr. Kuttner, for helping me see it.

Kuttner says: 

A related key question is whether Trump has any master plan for the economy here, or whether he is just batshit crazy. The evidence is that Trump’s effort to destroy the government reflects a certain malign consistency, but that his effort to destroy the economy is based on sheer ignorance and impulsivity.

It's not ignorance or impulsiveness. It can't be. It's a plan. A "deliberate" plan to create a depression. As Kuttner has it, "There are several distinct elements" to Trump's policy, "all cutting in the same direction, all interacting with each other, all needless." Together, they will create a depression.

Depression opens a door to the future that Donald Trump wants.

Trump wants regime change. He doesn't want democracy. He doesn't want to be restrained by the US Constitution. He wants to be a dictator -- "for one day," he said. Dictator for a short time, and then Emperor: Emperor of the Western Hemisphere: For now, Emperor of the US, Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Before long, no doubt, also Mexico and most or all of Central and South America. Willing to trade Gaza.

Why create a Depression? A depression will make it easier to get rid of the US Constitution. A depression will be the last straw, convincing an overwhelming majority of Americans that the existing US government is the cause of our economic problems and must be eliminated. They will torch the US Constitution and line up behind their Emperor.

But the proximate cause of our economic problems is excessive private-sector debt. The cause of that cause is that our economic policies encourage us to use credit, to help our economy grow.  Using credit to grow the economy works best when there is little accumulated debt. It does not work at all when we have been encouraged to use credit for 80 years and our accumulation of debt has become massive.


Required reading

First, read something that will give you a feel for how very good a good economy can be: From Time Magazine, Friday 31 December 1965: "We Are All Keynesians Now" at Brad DeLong's site. Or, if that title turns you off, read the first few paragraphs of Jude Wanniski's "The Way We Were":

... you have to have lived in the 1950s and 1960s to have experienced a good economy.

I want to be sure you know that for a very long time our economy has not been good. Wanniski says it well, but the Time article really makes you feel it.

Second, read page 30 from William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. I want to be sure you see that when a bad economy is very bad, people react as if the problem is political. Leuchtenburg tells us that

Henry Hazlitt proposed abandoning Congress for a directorate of twelve men.

He also quotes Barron's:

"Of course we all realize that dictatorships and even semi-dictatorships in peace time are quite contrary to the spirit of American institutions and all that," remarked Barron's. "And yet — well, a genial and lighthearted dictator might be a relief from the pompous futility of such a Congress as we have recently had. ... So we return repeatedly to the thought that a mild species of dictatorship will help us over the roughest spots in the road ahead."

Yes, you can change things by abandoning Congress. Yes, you can change things by abandoning the US Constitution. But if you want to change the economy, you need to do economic things. And if you want to improve the economy, then you must correctly understand what the problem is, what the economy's problem is, so that when you change economic policy the economy changes in the way that you want.

Saturday, April 12, 2025

A different world

The historian M. I. Rostovtzeff (1870-1952) on the fall of Rome:
What happened was a slow and gradual change, a shifting of values in the consciousness of men. What seemed to be all-important to a Greek of the classical or Hellenistic period, or to an educated Roman of the time of the Republic and of the Early Empire, was no longer regarded as vital by the majority of men who lived in the late Roman Empire and the Early Middle Ages. They had their own notion of what was important, and most of what was essential in the classical period among the constituent parts of ancient civilization was discarded by them as futile and often detrimental. Since our point of view is more or less that of the classical peoples, we regard such an attitude of mind as a relapse into "barbarism"....
From "The Decay of the Ancient World and Its Economic Explanations" by M. I. Rostovtzeff. In The Fall of Rome: Can It Be Explained? edited by Mortimer Chambers.

Friday, April 11, 2025

Understanding Trump's economic policy

At The American Prospect: "Donald Trump is on track to be the first president to deliberately engineer a severe depression." 

I see it that way. I expect depression. Depression opens a door to the future that Donald Trump wants.

Trump wants regime change. He doesn't want democracy. He doesn't want to be restrained by the US Constitution. He wants to be a dictator -- "for one day," he said. Dictator for a short time, and then Emperor: Emperor of the Western Hemisphere: For now, Emperor of the US, Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Before long, no doubt, also Mexico and most or all of Central and South America. Willing to trade Gaza.

Why create a Depression? A depression will make it easier to get rid of the US Constitution. A depression will be the last straw, convincing an overwhelming majority of Americans that the existing US government is the cause of our economic problems and must be eliminated. They will torch the US Constitution and line up behind their Emperor.

Thursday, April 10, 2025

Assessing the risk

Labor's sensibility -- labor's awareness of approaching recession -- is evident in three of the last four recessions, and in the current trend:

Labor Force Participation Rate: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1HWVL

The pandemic recession arose from non-economic causes. Since I am using sensibility to mean "the ability to feel and react" to an approaching recession, the 2020 recession should not even count. So make it three out of three recessions, plus the current trend.

When Labor Share goes up, Capital Share goes down. As the graph below shows, rising Labor Share typically brings on recession. Based on the graph, we might say the business decisions that increase Capital Share appear to be the decisions that create recessions.

Labor Share: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRS88003173

A trend of rising Labor Share typically ends in recession, yes. But unlike labor sensibility, Labor Share gives no early warning of recession.


My gut tells me that announced layoffs may give an early warning of recession:

But maybe these stats are not as bad as they sound.  This FRED graph shows that layoff counts were unusually low after the pandemic recession, in 2021 and 2022. As of 2025, however, layoff counts appear to be back in the normal range. So more surges in job cuts, coming now, could very likely be an early warning of recession.

And just the other day, Reuters reported that "US announced job cuts surge in March on Doge hit":

Layoffs announced by U.S. employers surged in March to the highest level since the pandemic recession as the government purged federal workers and contractors to slash spending.

It is as if the government wants to create a recession or (as I suggest) a depression. The federal government appears to be pushing hard for economic decline. Does that trouble you? It troubles me.

And, as if job cuts are not enough, the US and our trading partners appear to be engaged in a bidding war to raise tariff rates to the highest possible level. And curse our luck, the price increases created by tariffs are cost-push increases.

Cost-push slows the economy. 

That is what recession is: a slow economy. An even slower economy is called a depression.

 

We also have Milton Friedman saying

There is strong evidence that a monetary crisis involving a substantial decline in the quantity of money is a necessary and sufficient condition for a major depression.

And then we have the Donald and the DOGE, and giddy Musk with his symbolic chain saw, and the federal spending cuts of, oh, a trillion or two. Those cuts are an extra push, to push our economy toward depression. As if things are not bad enough already.

And then again we have Milton Friedman, this time saying "lower government spending can contribute to reduced monetary growth." A trillion or two less government spending might do no harm in a strong and healthy economy. But despite what people may say, and despite what we may want to think, our economy is not strong and healthy. So the government spending cuts concern me.

A reduction of federal spending can reduce money growth. A severe reduction of federal spending can be a necessary and sufficient condition for a major depression. Necessary and sufficient, Friedman said. "Sufficient" is the problem. Is a trillion or two of federal spending cuts sufficient? Is it enough to create a depression? What if we also double the price of imports? And if we take huge numbers of people out of the labor force?

The Trump tariffs increase import prices without increasing wages. Because of the tariffs, consumers will spend more to buy less. Spending more is a problem when we are not also earning more. And buying less slows the economy.

Tariffs slow the economy. The reduction in federal spending alone could be enough to create "a major depression." If not, tariffs may slow the economy enough to make it one. Labor Force Participation shows a trend of decline since September 2023 or before, so we could be in a recession already. (I don't think so; not yet, but soon.) And announced job cuts? Keep an eye on the news reports. You don't want to be the last to know.


"But, they're creating a depression? Why??" you might ask. "This is just crazy!!!"

If it was in fact the current Administration's intent to create a depression, surely they would not admit it. This does not prove that depression is their plan.

Nor does it prove that depression is not their plan.

Why? You want a why? I'll tell you why. Trump wants regime change. He doesn't want democracy. He doesn't want to be restrained by the US Constitution. He wants to be a dictator -- "for one day," he said. Dictator, for a short time. And after that, Emperor. Emperor of the Western Hemisphere: For now, emperor of the US, Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Before long, certainly also Mexico and probably all of Central and South America.

Why create a Depression? A depression will make it easier to get rid of the US Constitution. A depression will be the last straw, convincing the majority of Americans that the existing US government is the cause of our economic problems. (It is: The cause, specifically, is policy that promotes excessive reliance on credit in the private sector. But that does not mean we need to change our form of government.) A depression will have the voting majority ready to torch the Constitution.

Why depression? I refer you to a bit of US history from the Great Depression of the 1930s, from William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. Leuchtenburg writes:

Many argued that the country could get out of the morass of indecision only by finding a leader and vesting in him dictatorial powers. Some favored an economic supercouncil which would ignore Congress and issue edicts; Henry Hazlitt proposed abandoning Congress for a directorate of twelve men. Others wished to confer on the new president the same arbitrary war powers Woodrow Wilson had been granted. Even businessmen favored granting Roosevelt dictatorial powers when he took office. Distressed by the chaotic competition in industries such as oil and textiles, alarmed by the outbursts of violence, convinced of the need for drastic budget slashing, they despaired of any leadership from Congress. "Of course we all realize that dictatorships and even semi-dictatorships in peace time are quite contrary to the spirit of American institutions and all that," remarked Barron's. "And yet -- well, a genial and lighthearted dictator might be a relief from the pompous futility of such a Congress as we have recently had... So we return repeatedly to the thought that a mild species of dictatorship will help us over the roughest spots in the road ahead."

Depression opens a door to the future Donald Trump wants. That's why I expect a depression.

Wednesday, April 9, 2025

Uncertainty, updated thru March 2025

Uncertainty Index at FRED: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USEPUINDXM

Brings to mind an ancient Chinese curse: May you live in interesting times.


Recent Uncertainty Index posts:

Tuesday, April 8, 2025

8 April follow-up

In yesterday's post I said maybe Trump's tariff policies will somehow "be enough to prevent a slowdown of the US economy," and maybe

the shift toward more domestic purchasing will be enough to boost the growth of our economy -- which to me seems a central part of Trumpian economics. (But then, I always focus on growth. And really, I have no idea what Trump is thinking.) 

I mistakenly attributed my focus on growth to Trump. An easy mistake, as I have no clue what his objective actually is. No clue at all: You even saw me the other day asking if Trump is trying to create a global depression.

But at MarketWatch just now I found "Here’s the real reason Trump wants to create economic chaos — and why investors should be more afraid" (by Brett Arends, 26 March 2025) along with this subtitle text:

Trump administration wants a weaker dollar and lower Treasury yields to pay for U.S. tax cuts. A recession could be a part of the deal.

So maybe I'm not too far off, wondering if he's trying to create a depression.

 

The MarketWatch article, an opinion piece, was interesting. The opinion starts with an observation -- "The US Dollar is particularly strong" -- and a corrolary: The strong dollar makes US exports expensive and US imports cheap. That, they say, is

the absolutely essential context for understanding the Trump administration’s economic, financial and trade policies... Donald Trump wants to slash the value of the U.S. dollar against other international currencies, to make U.S.-manufactured products cheaper both at home and overseas while making other countries’ manufactured products more expensive.

That is gimmicky shit. Gimmicky economics. Maybe Trump will end up making the dollar weak and China's currency strong. What, China's not doing well enough without our help?

Hey, I don't like the US trade deficit either. But I'm not convinced the US trade deficit is Trump's focus. And I  don't think the trade deficit is the problem. FRED's Table 1.5.5 shows GDP as C + I + NX + G. NX is Net Exports. The Table links to this Net Exports graph. The graph shows that we have had a trade deficit since 1976. The article says "The US dollar is currently going through a phase of broad over-valuation." What, a phase that began in 1976?

Maybe Trump does want to weaken the dollar. But surely this would not be a long-term strategy. Nations with weak or declining currencies are not well respected, if I rightly grasp human nature. But Trump demands respect. And I don't even trust the idea that creating a recession would help weaken the dollar. It would have to be a US-only recession. That is not likely, in our globalized world.

Besides, it was less than 20 years ago that economists were panicked about the financial crisis creating a full-fledged depression. People say things like "the fundamentals are sound." But they said that during the financial crisis, too. They just say it to build consumer confidence. They don't know. They only hope the fundamentals are sound. As do we all.

But "All Sectors" debt (relative to GDP) was just as high in 2020 as it was in 2009. The peaks look similar on the graph, and the two declines from peak look identical. One more recession now, and we get a third identical peak. With a depression, we get a much higher peak. The fundamentals are sound, my ass.

And yes, I know, during the campaign Trump said

I don’t want to be Herbert Hoover. The one president – I just don’t want to be Herbert Hoover

He doesn't want to be the guy that starts the Depression. At least, that's what he said.

Monday, April 7, 2025

I can't get enough Nixon-as-Bad-Guy stories, but...

This is Milton Friedman's Nixon-as-Bad-Guy story:

You know why price and wage controls are imposed? They are imposed whenever a Government wants to inflate. The imposition of price and wage controls is a sure sign that the Government wants to inflate. After all, Governments are not foolish. The people who do these things aren’t stupid. They know the record of history. They know as well as you and I do that wage and price controls don’t have anything to do with inflation, then why do they impose them? Because they want to inflate and this is a way in which on the one hand they can inflate and on the other can give the public the impression that they are doing something about inflation. In addition, they want to postpone the evil consequences of inflation. They want to have as much of their inflation as possible come out initially in the form of increased output. After all, politicians are necessarily short sighted. As elections come near, they try to postpone the problem. Look at the record in recent years. In the United States in 1971, Mr. Nixon imposed price and wage controls at a time when our rate of inflation was running at the horrendous level of 4½% a year. That temporarily suppressed inflation but the final result of those wage and price controls was an inflation at the rate of 12% a year. It was perfectly clear that the reason Mr. Nixon imposed price and wage controls at that time is that he wanted to take expansionary fiscal and monetary measures that would create a favourable economic climate for the 1972 elections.

Source: "Can Inflation Be Cured" from Milton Friedman in Australia, 1975.

When I first read the Milton Friedman paper linked above, for me the Nixon paragraph was a prize find. This time when I read it (while writing this post) I was surprised to see that Friedman's version is only another inflation story, a wage-and-price-controls-are-useless story. In everything else I have read on the Nixon re-election, the scandal was that Nixon put his buddy Burns in charge at the Fed and Burns delayed raising interest rates long enough "to make sure the economy was robust going into the election" as the National Review article (see below) puts it. 

And Nixon's wage and price controls were only needed until the election was over. Nixon wasn't saving the economy. He was saving his job.

Yes, Friedman adds depth to the story, but he leaves out the best parts. And he doesn't bring in the co-conspirator Burns, at all. 

Manipulation of Federal Reserve policy decisions is a key piece of the story. But Friedman, as usual, is always and everywhere focused on inflation to the point where it almost ruins a great Nixon story!


Wikipedia's "Arthur F. Burns" article -- Burns was Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1970 to 1978 -- Wikipedia links to the 2004 National Review article "(More) Politics at the Fed?" by Bruce Bartlett. That's the one you want to read. The link to that article is broken. National Review now has it at this address and attributed to RIDHancock instead of to Bartlett. And yet, just below the NR article we still find this:

Bruce Bartlett is senior fellow for the National Center for Policy Analysis.
Bartlett writes: "Nixon wanted to keep monetary policy loose in order to make sure the economy was robust going into the election."

Nixon wanted a robust economy because he was the incumbent running for re-election. If he wasn't the incumbent he'd have wanted the economy going from bad to worse. In the context of the Biden years, if I was running against Biden and I was a dirtbag like Nixon, I would have talked the Fed into delaying the increase of interest rates for a year in order to get inflation raging, and I'd have been calling it "the Biden inflation" every time I opened my mouth.

I'd have done everything in my power to make Biden's economy look bad and worse and worst. But that's just me.

Wednesday, April 2, 2025

Trumpian Mercantilism

A tariff is a tax on imports. The tax is paid by the importer, with the cost passed along to the customer.

Historically, if I have this right, less-developed nations (like the US in its first century) imposed tariffs to increase the cost of imports. That makes domestic products more competitive and helps the domestic economy grow. 

In Trump's case, I don't see how the US benefits by imposing tariffs -- other than revenue gain for the federal government. He doesn't seem to say. I don't imagine he thinks making imports more expensive will make anyone happy. The tariffs could eventually be good for domestic employment -- something I never hear on CNN -- but certainly not before a four-year term has expired. 

I cannot imagine that such a benefit would arise quickly. An improved employment picture will not begin to emerge until the effects of tariff policy become clear. So far, the only effect we've seen is a shocking increase in uncertainty.

As a general statement, my tidy observation is that tariff policy is mercantile economics, and certainly not modern economic thinking. That's the reason Trump's econ seem so strange, so alien to us today.

It has been said that Adam Smith and his 1776 book moved economic thought away from the mercantile focus on accumulating gold and silver -- which mercantilism tried to achieve by improving the balance of trade by means of tariffs -- and moved economic thought to a focus on wealth being the output produced and enjoyed by business activity and its customers. 

Where Trump is taking our economy remains to be seen.


Domestic inflation (for which labor unfailingly gets the blame) increases prices of US products at home and abroad. Inflation prices us out of foreign markets and is largely responsible for the US trade deficit. So if Trump wants to improve the balance of trade, he will want to keep domestic wage increases to a  minimum, to keep US product prices down in foreign markets.

Meanwhile, the Trump tariffs will increase the price of imports, and reduce the volume of imports that we in the US buy. 

I don't see how these policy outcomes will be beneficial to the US economy or to US labor. The effect on US business, it is too soon to say. And, again, the Trump tariffs will boost tax revenue to the federal government, at our expense.

 

The problem with the Trump plan is that it is at best only vaguely related to the central economic problem of our age which is, in the words of the American economist Vladimir Simkhovitch, labor cannot support life.

The trade deficit is certainly one problem. But it cannot be that excessively high wages caused the inflation that priced US output out of foreign markets. If wages were high enough to create our trade deficit, we would all be thrilled with our paychecks. But that is surely not the case.

I am not a fan of globalization. I believe we must learn to provide ourselves with full employment by our domestic policy. But tariffs on imports are not domestic policy. And the media is already talking "trade war".

As I understand Trump's economic thinking, using tariffs to boost the prices of imports will increase domestic purchases of domestic output. But to the extent that we have been buying imports for the cost savings, if the tariffs get us to buy American we will be paying higher prices anyway. Because of the tariffs. Yes, we'll be buying American, but at prices we avoided in pre-tariff days. Trump is not solving our economic problem.

If we are paying more, without more income, then we will have to be buying less, or saving less, or both. If we are buying less, demand is down and the economy gets a little slower and unemployment tends to go up. Not a good outcome.

Perhaps the tariff revenue will allow Trump to cut taxes on wages, and boost take-home pay. Perhaps this boost will be enough to offset the higher prices we are paying to buy domestic rather than imports. Perhaps it will be enough to prevent a slowdown of the US economy. Perhaps the shift toward more domestic purchasing will be enough to boost the growth of our economy -- which to me seems a central part of Trumpian economics. (But then, I always focus on growth. And really, I have no idea what Trump is thinking.) Eventually, perhaps, the resulting growth of domestic output will boost employment. Eventually, and perhaps.


Stagflation? Stagflation has been in the news lately. Stagflation is inflation in a stagnant economy: inflation and stagnation at the same time. Or, as the definitions describe it these days: high inflation and high unemployment, at the same time.

This surprises me. Granted, inflation doesn't want to come down to 2 percent. But it did stabilize at 3 percent, as of June 2023.  That's not good enough for the Federal Reserve. They want 2 percent. I think the economy changed during the Biden inflation, and the economy now wants 3 percent. And in a battle with the economy, I don't think the Fed can win. I've been concerned for a while now that by insisting on 2 percent, the Fed is slowing the economy enough to create a recession.

So yeah, I guess, inflation is too high and I worry about unemployment rising, so this sounds like stagflation. I don't see it as stagflation. I see it as bad policy. If inflation comes down rapidly to the 3 percent level and then stays there despite the Federal Reserve, I don't see that as high inflation. I see it as a change in the economy. And as I see things, it is the job of economists (and of hobbyists like me) to notice changes and try to understand them. Try to understand the cause of the change.

If the Fed wants to bring inflation down from a "natural" target of 3 percent to the Fed's target of 2 percent, the Fed needs first to understand the problem the economy has with 2 percent.

Far as I'm concerned, the Fed is scolding the economy for failing to behave as the Fed wants. I don't think the Fed can win that battle. I think the Fed should stop barreling forward, and start re-thinking its understanding of the economy. But hey, that's just me.

With a correct understanding of the economy, of the economic problem, the Federal Reserve, together with Congress and the President, could easily solve the economic problem. Easily. But I do not mean the inflation and unemployment problem. For the economy, inflation and unemployment are not problems. For the economy, they are solutions to the problem that disturbs our economy. 

Inflation and unemployment are problems for people. In order to solve these problems, we have to give the economy what it wants, so that it will stop creating inflation and unemployment.

But hey, that's just me.

 

Yes, stagflation has been in the news a lot, lately. I did a Google search for the word stagflation, set the "Tools: Any time" option to different time periods, and jotted down the estimated number of results:

 Start Date            End Date           Results
Jan 1, 2022Dec 31, 202253,300
Jan 1, 2023Dec 31, 202358,600
Jan 1, 2024Dec 31, 2024289,300
Mar 31, 2024Mar 31, 20251,710,300

The first three results are by year; the last is for the most recent 12-month period as of this writing.

Myself, I have not been predicting stagflation. I do see stagflation as a likely result of the Trump tariffs, but not from general economic conditions.

Yes, the tariffs. Tariffs increase prices. Without a corresponding increase in the quantity of money, and in wages, we will have to buy less simply because we don't have the money. Yes, we could all borrow more and spend the borrowed funds and then everything would be fine -- but not really. Private-sector debt is already so high that the economy struggles to achieve even the bare minimum of growth. Solving the tariff-cost problem by borrowing more is an unsatisfactory solution to a problem that should never have been created.

Too much of the money we spend goes to pay for the money we spend, instead of to pay for the products we buy. Excessive debt, excessive private-sector debt is the real, underlying problem. I think the Fed's inflation target, the 2 percent target that maybe should now be 3 percent, I think that purposefully shooting for an inflation rate above zero is the only thing that keeps our economy growing at all. And we need that extra money in the economy every year because interest and principal absorb so much of our disposable income.

Labor cannot afford to live because wages have not kept up with costs. How did this happen? It happened because our reliance on credit tends to increase until the economy gets in trouble. Interest, yeah, a problem. But interest rates go up and down. Debt goes up and up, and doesn't come down until it comes crashing down in a time of economic crisis, as it did in 2008 and for much of the next decade.

By the way, debt came down -- or actually, debt grew, but very slowly -- during the Savings and Loan crisis from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Slow borrowing meant a slow increase in the Q of M, which would slow the economy. So the Fed permitted an unusually large increase in the quantity of M1 money, transaction money.

What happened was our reliance on interest-free money increased while our reliance on borrowed funds decreased. The net effect was a decrease in the cost of using money. And that difference was enough to allow excellent economic growth in the latter 1990s. It's simple. And as I said, it's easy. And by the way, in the latter 1990s the federal deficit was briefly reduced to nothing. We should do more of that, reducing our reliance on credit and replacing that costly money with cash. With greenbacks. With income. To make it happen, policies need to change.

Or, you know, we can opt for primitive, mercantile policies like tariffs and stir up trouble with neighboring nations. It's your call.

Friday, March 28, 2025

Deposits and reserves

I think I have this right.

Reserves are very much like deposits, except deposits are between a bank and its customers, and reserves are between the central bank and its customers. The Fed creates money from nothing, to lend to banks. Banks create money from nothing, to lend to their customers. Deposits are not loaned out; neither are reserves. Deposits stay in the banking system unless withdrawn as cash. So do reserves.

It's a two-tiered structure of banking. The structure is generally the same, but on two different levels. Looking at it this way, reserves make sense to me.

Wednesday, March 26, 2025

Before solving a problem, one must know what the problem is

"We are not doing well in the world of education," Trump says, as he guts the Department of Education.

That is one example out of hundreds, or thousands, of Trump pointing out a result of our long economic decline, and treating that result as a problem to be solved by reduction -- by reducing the size and cost of the department or shutting it down altogether -- when what we need is to turn the economy around.

Democrats, however, don't see it correctly either, so there is little or no chance that the root problem will be solved. 

Sunday, March 23, 2025

An exercise

I just want to see a number. I want to see where the federal debt would be, if we make allowance for federal responses to the Savings and Loan Crisis, the Great Recession, and the pandemic.

The Savings and Loan Crisis (2.2% of 1989 GDP)

Wikipedia says

The savings and loan crisis ... was the failure of approximately a third of the savings and loan associations (S&Ls or thrifts) in the United States between 1986 and 1995... The total cost [to] taxpayers by the end of 1999 was $123.8 billion...

And the FDIC Banking Review Vol 13, No. 2 says

It has been more than a decade since enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which began the taxpayers’ involvement in the cleanup of the savings and loan industry.


The Great Recession (5.7% of 2009 GDP)

Forbes of 17 Feb 2020 says

Exactly 11 years ago today, February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or the Recovery Act into law. The $831 billion in spending kicked off the longest period of economic growth and job creation in American history.

Heritage Foundation of 24 March 2020 says

In the wake of the housing meltdown and financial crisis, Congress passed the largest stimulus-spending package in American history... Vice President Joe Biden barnstormed around the country in 2010 promising a “Summer of Recovery” that never came.

He "barnstormed around"??

And of course Heritage, a nonpartisan, nonprofit charity, says

Keynesian stimulus almost always fails, and often makes the downturn worse and the eventual recovery weaker.
without any recognition of the financial roots of the 2009 recession or that "financial recessions are particularly problematic" -- as Google's AI Overview says:

Yes, financial recessions, stemming from issues in the financial markets, tend to be more severe and costly than those caused by other factors, often leading to significant economic downturns and lasting damage.

The Forbes article calls it the longest recovery. Heritage calls it the slowest. I love the irony.


The COVID-19 Pandemic (21.8% of 2020 GDP)

Investopedia says

According to official U.S. government tallies as of July 31, 2024, the U.S. had spent a total of $4.65 trillion on a variety of programs related to COVID-19 relief.


Adjusting the Federal Debt

I start with the FRED's FYGFD, an annual measure of the federal debt. To adjust for the Savings and Loan crisis I subtract $123.8 billion from the FYGFD number for 1989. This makes the federal debt falsely low for most of a decade. But it self-corrects by the end of 1999 because all that money was borrowed and spent by then. From 1999 to 2009, adjusted debt runs on the low side of the FRED data.

From the federal debt for 2009 I subtract the $831 Billion of the 2009 response to the Great Recession. Again, I let the passing years correct my lazy assumption that the whole 831 was spend in one year. After a decade, I figure, that money was all spent, and my number is a good estimate again.

And from the federal debt for 2020 I subtract the $4.65 Trillion COVID response. As that money was all spent by mid-2024, I figure my estimate is right by that date.

Without those three responses to economic crises, the federal debt would now be about
equal to GDP, some 20 percent of GDP less than it actually is. For what that's worth.

Yeah, I know: The graph ends in 2023. I know. But this is only an estimate, and now I have seen it.

I guess the government didn't "have to" rescue the economy those three times in the past 36 years. But if we did nothing, we might still today be in the middle of a Depression caused by the Savings and Loan mess.

That's okay. Trump is hard at work creating the next one.

Saturday, March 22, 2025

He was right

"The authoritarian state systems of today seem to solve the problem of unemployment at the expense of efficiency and of freedom. It is certain that the world will not much longer tolerate the unemployment which, apart from brief intervals of excitement, is associated and in my opinion, inevitably associated with present-day capitalistic individualism."

Thursday, March 20, 2025

A Certain Uncertainty

FRED Source Graph: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1ERg3

Uncertainty fell rapidly in the first four months of the Biden presidency. Uncertainty rose sharply in the month of Trump's election, then paused for two months, and rose sharply again in February of this year. Between the rapid Biden decline and the sharp Trump increase in policy uncertainty, we see Biden's four years. 

During those four years, uncertainty ran low from April to October 2021. Then it rose until October 2022. Then it dropped off until August 2023. Then it ran lower, until the election. 

The second graph shows the Biden years:

FRED Source Graph: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1EW8a

The blue line shows policy uncertainty during the Biden years. The red line shows "the Biden inflation". The paths of the two lines show interesting similarity, don't you think?

Sunday, March 16, 2025

To repeat something that should be obvious...

I watched John Oliver the other day, an old one, S11E15, June 16 2024, "Trump's Second Term". He ran a clip from a promotional video for Project 2025, a conservative manifesto I suppose you'd call it. The line in the video that caught my ear was this:

"... to end Washington's bureaucracy and restore American prosperity..."

As if ending the bureaucracy will restore prosperity. These people are totally out of ideas.

It was the word "prosperity" that got my attention. If you're talking prosperity, you're talking about economic performance. You're talking about the economy.

These Project 25 guys, they think they know how to fix the economy. But it sounds like they are still thinking what Reagan thought:

"Only by reducing the growth of government," said Ronald Reagan, "can we increase the growth of the economy."

After 44 years, these people have learned nothing. Reagan was wrong about why economic growth is slow. Growth is slow because we have too much debt in the private sector.

Growth is slow because we have too much debt in the private sector.

 

Hey, we don't want to grow the government, right? We want the private sector to grow. That's where the money is, and the jobs and all. So the Project 25 guys want to "end Washington's bureaucracy" and "reduce the growth of government". Other people say government should spend more, to help the private sector grow. The two sides couldn't be more at odds.

As those other people often point out, Reagan grew the federal debt. But if you look at the debt of all US sectors, or of domestic non-financial sectors, or of the private non-financial sector, or of households alone, you'll notice that debt growth slowed in the mid-1980s (because of the Savings & Loan Crisis) and slowed again around 2008 (due to the financial crisis). 

And if you look closely at household debt,

Graph #1: US Household Debt, 1946-1980
  • you will see it slowing from 1946 to 1955 (the line curves downward), 
  • running at a constant rate from 1955 to 1965 (the line runs straight), and
  • slowing down from 1965 to 1970 (the line curves down relative to 1955-65).

So there was also a slowdown of debt growth in the latter 1960s, at least for household debt.

It is all this slowing of debt growth that has slowed our economy. Slower growth of debt in the private sector means a slower increase in borrowing and spending -- and a slower increase in spending is closely tied to slower growth of the economy.

Also, the lines on the FRED graphs only go up, which means our debt is always increasing. Maybe increasing faster sometimes and slower at other times, but always increasing. So debt service is also always increasing, at least in the big picture. Increases in debt service take money away from current spending, and therefore contribute to making our economy grow more slowly.

I attribute the slow growth of our economy entirely to our accumulated debt. Most people ignore that line of thought. We can compromise, if you like, and say accumulated debt and your concerns have combined to slow our economy. I don't object to trying your solutions. I object to not reducing debt in the private sector.


In the latter 1960s debt growth slowed, and in the mid-80s, and again after 2008. Three warnings, the economy has given us. Three warning we have ignored. We're not too bright, are we.

Speaking of which, the Project 25 guys seem to think that cutting back on government bureaucracy (and on government spending and government debt, I presume) will lead us to "prosperity". Their word: prosperity.

It's funny, you know: There actually is a connection between government debt and prosperity. But that connection does not require us to reduce government debt. Nor does it require us to increase government debt. It only requires that private debt be low enough (relative to government debt) that private debt can grow fast enough that the economy grows at the rate we want.

It requires that private debt be low enough, relative to government debt, that private debt can grow fast enough to make us prosperous.

 

When I Google times of US prosperity, three periods come up: the "Roaring '20s", the 1947-1973 "golden age", and the "new economy" of the mid-to-latter 1990s. All three of those periods of prosperity were times when private debt was increasing relative to public debt. As you can see:

The Tides of Prosperity


The other times, when private debt gets too high, and when it falls relative to public debt, are not times of prosperity. This is something people will never see as long as they focus only on federal debt.

It's not that we have to increase the federal debt or reduce it. It's not that we have to increase or reduce private debt. What we have to do is coordinate the two measures of debt.

When private debt gets too high, relative to public debt, prosperity cannot continue. The problem is that excessive financial cost hinders growth. I don't know how economists missed that detail, but it seems that they have.

When private debt gets low enough, prosperity is able to resume. After it resumes, prosperity appears to become self-supporting. But private debt always tends to grow faster than the economy. And federal debt tends to grow less in times of prosperity. So, in prosperous times, the private-to-public debt ratio rises, and rises until prosperity can no longer be sustained.

When private-sector financial cost becomes excessive, prosperity fades. Remember 2008?


One thing that does not show up on the Prosperity graph is the increase in debt: Debt only increases. The private-to-public debt ratio sometimes rises and sometimes falls, but debt only increases -- except in times of crisis, of course. But then, times of crisis are not times of prosperity.

Suppose that we want prosperity, but we also want the federal debt to be less than it is. Okay then, we will have to do something to reduce private-sector debt. Also, private-sector debt has to decrease faster than federal debt, to bring the ratio down until prosperity resumes. That is the trick. 

We have to bring private-sector debt down. And that is difficult to do. But it is easier to reduce private-sector debt than it is to reduce the federal debt. In the 44 years since Reagan -- and for 20 years before that -- we have been unable to bring the federal debt down. Yes, Clinton almost did it in the latter 1990s. But those were years of prosperity and, unfortunately, the prosperity didn't last.

To reduce the federal debt, we must be prosperous. And to be prosperous we must reduce debt in the private sector. That is difficult to do because economic policy promotes the use of credit. Because of policy, the private-sector use of credit grows fast, unnaturally fast. And the use of credit creates debt, so our debt also grows unnaturally fast. Thus, we have to come up with policies that encourage and accelerate the repayment of private-sector debt. 

We have policies that encourage credit use and the growth of debt. To offset the effect of those policies, we need policies that encourage repayment of debt. Such policies will lead to prosperity and, if we do it right, to long-term prosperity. 

As a bonus, accelerated repayment of debt would also help to fight inflation.

You heard it here first.

Thursday, March 13, 2025

And now a few words from Milton Friedman

The Trump agenda, cut-cut-cutting the federal government, it's like we are married to it: for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, for better or for worse.

Milton Friedman wanted to say a few words:

Just as higher government spending can contribute to excessive monetary growth, so lower government spending can contribute to reduced monetary growth.

And also this:

There is strong evidence that a monetary crisis involving a substantial decline in the quantity of money is a necessary and sufficient condition for a major depression.

In recent posts we have seen the quantity of money running low, problematically low relative to GDP-at-actual-prices, and problematically low relative to accumulated non-federal debt. And not long ago we saw graphs showing

  • the low quantity of "base" money as a recurring problem;
  • federal debt running below-trend, contributing to the financial crisis and 2009 recession;
  • and the effects of changes in the M1-to-GDP ratio.

Milton Friedman wants you to be cautious and careful, Donald. So do I.

 

Ah, and something I didn't notice until just now: 

Coincidence? Sure, Donald. Keep thinking that, Mister I-don't-want-to-be-Herbert-Hoover.

Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Does Google's AI Overview have a creative mind?

Checking my work for a blog post, I googled was the US recession of 1982 severe

Yes, Gaio said, it was severe. 

 

Old responses from the AI Overview sometimes turn up in new Google search results, often in the "People also ask" section. Maybe Google archives the responses. I'm gonna test that theory by linking to Gaio's response to my question about the '82 recession.

It works. For now, at least.

 

Gaio said the 1982 recession "was the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression." You could probably find that said of most of the recessions since the Great Depression. But I got the confirmation I was looking for.

Gaio also gave some stats that I might want to consider when evaluating recession severity:

  • The unemployment rate peaked at 10.8%...
  • Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by 2.7%...
  • The prime interest rate reached a record high of 21.5%...

You'd think there would be a standard, accepted method (say, GDP contraction) for evaluating recession severity. But if there is, I never saw it.

Under "Other effects" Gaio lists more things I might want to use when evaluating the Volcker experiment:

  • The recession led to homelessness.
  • The recession contributed to the Latin American debt crisis.
  • The recession contributed to long-lasting slowdowns in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African countries.
  • The recession contributed to the US savings and loan crisis.

Yeah, I dunno.

The best part of Gaio's response was the statement about the causes of the recession:

The recession was caused in part by Paul Volcker's tight money policy to fight inflation. The recession was also affected by the Reagan administration's fiscal policy.

The recession was caused by Volcker's tight money, and affected by fiscal policy.

I don't suppose I can get away with assuming Gaio was relying on the subtle differences in meaning of "caused by" and "affected by". But I do like seeing tight money get most of the blame. Gaio's evaluation is correct, I think. And the AI view lends credence to Milton Friedman's view that

There is strong evidence that a monetary crisis involving a substantial decline in the quantity of money is a necessary and sufficient condition for a major depression. Fluctuations in monetary growth are also systematically related to minor ups and downs in the economy...

But I cannot say what I just said: that "the AI view lends credence to Milton Friedman's view". The AI view is not original, objective thinking. Far as I can tell, it is always a compilation of what it finds on the internet. It expresses things very well, far better than I can, sad to say. But if I lay out a problem -- the growth of financial cost -- and present it as a long-term cost-push problem, and point out that cost-push hinders economic growth (while demand-pull does not), will Gaio assemble the components on his own, make the argument that Excessive Reliance on Credit has increasingly made inflation a cost-push phenomenon, and conclude that our inability to achieve decent economic growth is a result of Financial cost-push?

Maybe. But I don't think he can assemble the components and arrive at a new theory.

Tuesday, March 11, 2025

The Bills to be Paid, and the Money to Pay Them

Here's another transaction-money graph. M1 money. This graph compares the bills we have to pay to the quantity of money we use to pay the bills. This time "the bills" is all the debt in FRED's TCMDO, except the federal government component. I know a lot of people blame the federal debt for all our economic problems, so I'm leaving it out.

I thought about leaving out "financial debt" again this time, too, but bills are bills. If you got bills you gotta pay, you gotta pay them. And that takes money, even for those in the financial sector.

Again, the graph uses transaction money. M1 money. This time the graph shows debt relative to the quantity of transaction money, the money we use to pay down our debt.

Debt of All US Sectors except the Federal Government, per Dollar of M1 Money

Excel's exponential trend line is based on the gentle upward sweep of the blue line from start-of-data (Q1 1959) to Q4 1990. The blue line -- non-federal debt relative to M1 money -- goes below-trend beginning in Q1 1991, reaches a low in Q4 1993 and returns to trend around Q1 2001, then remains on-trend until around mid-2005. After mid-2005 the blue line rises above the trend line and reaches an economically disastrous peak in Q1 2008.

The blue line goes below trend in the early 1990s in part because the growth of debt slowed from Q4 1985 to Q4 1991 and remained unusually slow until 1997. Much of this slow growth of debt can be attributed to the Savings and Loan Crisis of those years; on the graph, some is due to a period of rapid growth in M1 money (and the debt-to-M1 calculation).

This graph of M1 at FRED shows unusual increase in M1 from 1992 to mid-1997; that increase supported the return of debt growth to the 10% level and probably helped end the S&L Crisis. Also, in my view, the unusual increase in the quantity of money was largely responsible for the economic boom of the latter 1990s.

Those good years of the 1990s? On the graph, those are the years when the blue line starts out below-trend, and runs rapidly uphill while getting back to trend. The way our economy is, the way economic policy makes it, the economy is only good when debt can increase rapidly, as it did from 1994 to 2001.

The trouble is, the more debt we have, the more difficult it is for debt to increase rapidly. I think people just don't want that much debt.

That M1 graph shows a similar but smaller unusual increase from 1986 to 1989, which no doubt helped the economy through the S&L Crisis; and smaller yet, an increase from September 1982 to September 1984, which smoothed the transition from the harsh recession of 1982 to Ronald Reagan's good economy of 1984.

Look again at the graph above, the graph of non-federal debt per dollar of M1 money. Increases in transaction money helped the economy survive the S&L Crisis and the unusually slow debt growth that accompanied it. Then, in the high-productivity-growth years of the 1990s, increases in transaction money supported economic activity and helped sustain those good years. In good times and bad, when the quantity of transaction money is insufficient, increases can help.

Not that the trend is trustworthy, but: In the 1990s the debt was below trend, and the economy was very good for a while. After 2005, the debt was above trend and our "old normal" economy died. 

Monday, March 10, 2025

Tight money. Visibly tight

Based on my rough estimate, repayment of principal for household debt runs on average about 5 percent of outstanding household debt each year.

Let's say the number is 5 percent for domestic nonfinancial debt in general.

Let's also say we don't borrow money to pay down our debt. So then we must be using transaction money for those payments. M1 money. M1 is the money we receive as paychecks. Pocket money. Checking account money, if anyone still pays by check. The money we use to buy all the output in GDP, except when we buy on credit. 

 

Paying down debt destroys money. So let's look at the quantity of M1 money after we subtract the 5 percent of domestic nonfinancial debt we pay off each year, and look at what's left in M1 as a percent of GDP:

M1 (less 5% of Domestic Nonfinancial Debt) as Percent of GDP

As you can see, transaction money was so tight between 2000 and 2010 that the repayment of 5 percent of the principal would have drawn M1 down to a number below zero. If you want an explanation for the cause of the financial crisis and Great Recession, this is all that you need.

Transaction money is the money we spend. Too much of it causes inflation. But not enough of it is a problem, too. And it is probably safe to say that every recession shown on the graph was caused by a decline in the quantity of M1 money. For the 2001 recession and the "great recession" of 2009, it is undeniable.


I stopped the graph in 2019 because the Federal Reserve redefined savings to be part of transaction money in 2020, adding some $12 trillion to M1 overnight. The FRED graph of M1 shows it. I see this change, and all of the increase since 2010, as an admission by the Fed that they let M1 get much too low, apparently without realizing it. Yeah, they watch interest rates like hawks watch mice, but the quantity of money is another matter.

You remember what Friedman said, right? No, not the "always and everywhere" thing. This:

There is strong evidence that a monetary crisis involving a substantial decline in the quantity of money is a necessary and sufficient condition for a major depression.

The quote is from Chapter 2, on page 48 in my copy of Money Mischief. Look it up in yours.

 

The moral of the story: In a tight-money world, excessive reliance on credit is ultimately self-defeating.

And, no: Counting savings as part of M1 money does not solve the problem.

Saturday, March 8, 2025

"Dodd-Frank under fire" (2017)

At the start of Trump's second, an old (February 2017) blog post at Twenty-Cent Paradigms is an interesting read: Dodd-Frank Under Fire

 

Friday, March 7, 2025

The Donald Trump Uncertainty Index

Economic policy uncertainty: Since 2005 there have been three times of high uncertainty in regard to economic policy:

  1. A long period of abnormally high uncertainty during the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the so-called "Great Recession" of 2008-09, and until 2013 when uncertainty finally began to decline;

  2. A shorter but extremely high period of policy uncertainty arising from the pandemic of 2020; and

  3. A sudden rapid increase, from a low of 97.3 in October 2024 to near the 160 level (in November & December 2024 and January 2025) and then to the most recent (February 2025) level of almost 240 -- in all a sharp, rapid reaction to the November election.

The Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index since 2005

 

The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index since 1985:

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USEPUINDXM

The jagged blue line indicates economic policy uncertainty. The Uncertainty Index appears to go high at times of recession. In addition there are a couple highs in the 1980s during the Savings and Loan Crisis, and the long-running high following the Great Recession, noted above.

 I added vertical dash-dot lines indicating November 1 of Presidential Election years:

  • 1988: George H. W. Bush
  • 1992: Bill Clinton
  • 2000: George W. Bush
  • 2008: Barack Obama 
  • 2016: Donald Trump
  • 2020: Joe Biden
  • 2024: Donald Trump

None of these election-date indicators occur at  moments of sudden increase in the Uncertainty Index unless there is also a recession around the same time. None of them, that is, until the 2024 election of Donald Trump.

In the months since the Trump victory, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index suddenly spiked upward, nearly reaching the 240 level in February, the third highest point on the graph after the pandemic-related cluster and the August 2011 high. The reaction was immediate, beginning in the month of the election.

An interesting statistic, given the current political environment.

 

For a bigger graph, click the graph image above. For an even better view, click the link below the graph to see it at FRED.

The Fred page links to an info page identifying three types of data used to create the index: news coverage, disagreement among economic forecasts, and, interestingly, "tax code expiration data".

FRED also links to the EPU home page, which displays a large selection of policy uncertainty graphs, including a global measure.

In addition, FRED links to Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty, a 75-page PDF by Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis.

Thursday, March 6, 2025

Trump's Address to Congress

Tuesday, 4 March 2025

I wanted to watch Trump's address to Congress because I cannot tell from the fragments I see on CNN if Trump has a plan for the economy.

He does appear to have a plan. And he did say that fixing the economy is "among my very highest priorities" (to fix it, to improve it, something like that. I missed the word). But after that, the next thing I have in my notes is Trump calling the post-pandemic inflation "the worst inflation, perhaps ever, in the history of our country" which is a crock of shit. Trump does not have enough respect for our economy to tell the truth about it. As you know, I think the Employment Level data for the first month of Trump's second term was fake news. And as you can imagine, I am not happy that Trump wants to change the way GDP is measured.

Hey, the data for GDP excluding the government component is already available. If you want to take government spending out of GDP you can do it in seconds. At FRED, grab the GDP series and subtract from it the GCE series. Done

Oh, and at Vox, a good read: Economic growth is slowing — so Trump wants to redefine “economic growth”. The NY Times has Commerce Secretary's Comments Raise Fears of Interference in Federal Data.

Next, Trump blamed Biden for the price of eggs. Then he described his plan to fight inflation: "Reducing the cost of energy and ending the flagrant waste of taxpayer dollars."  How, sir, how are you gonna do that? Fire everyone you can fire, and drill-baby-drill? That's it, I guess. Nothing esoteric in that. But how does it fix the bird flu problem?

My note-taking was rushed, and my handwriting is illegible at best. My notes have Trump saying "by getting rid of fraud in social security we will cut grocery prices." I gagged on that line when he said it. Prices and costs are related. If not, then prices and profits are related. It shouldn't be hard to figure out the problem even if it is something other than bird flu.

And then, Trump promised to balance the federal budget. Note that he did not promise to avoid creating a Greater Depression in the process. That's my concern, the worst-case bad ending. And Trump is already messing with the GDP data, so you know he is worried also about the worst case. Trump doesn't want to be Herbert Hoover, and all that.


At one point Trump said he wants to make interest payments on car loans tax-deductible, "but only if the cars are made in America." That was interesting. However, by making loans less costly, deductible interest encourages people to go deeper into debt. And the problem with our economy, the biggest of all the problems with our economy, is that the private sector is already so deep in debt that we can no longer borrow enough to offset the cost of debt service and have enough left to boost the economy by spending it. This is the problem that needs to be solved. Making interest on car loans tax-deductible will not solve the problem. It will make the problem worse.

To be clear, federal debt is not the problem. It is a problem, yes; but the federal debt is not the cause of the private-sector problem. Federal debt, really, is a measure of the size of the economic problem of the private sector. Excessive private-sector debt is the cause of the private-sector problem. If we rely less on borrowed money and more on income -- if policy creates this change -- then a reduction of business interest cost can offset an increase in labor cost, with something left over to boost business profits.

I may regret saying this, but I think Trump is modeling himself to be our Caesar, ending the Republic and creating an Empire. He would be far better off, as would we all, if he modeled himself after Solon, the forgiver of debt.


In the Tuesday night speech, Trump mentioned a lot of new investment. In my notes I have him saying "$1.7 trillion of new investment in just the last few weeks." A sentence or two later, that new investment spending turned into announcements of plans for investment "in the US instead of in China". Not sure I got that last quote right, but I got the gist of it. 

If Trump wasn't lying about that investment, good. I could probably set aside my concern about a Greater Depression, and I would be happy to do that. But he lies all the time, so I can't trust him on the big new dollars of investment. I will look into it, after I finish these remarks. I wish I could do better. But he's the one that lies all the time, so it's on him.

In my notes, just before my note about the new investment, Trump called his first term the "most successful economy in the history of our country." Bullshit.

 

The next thing in my notes, after the grandiosity of taking credit for the most successful economy in the history of our country, is Trump saying

reciprocal tariffs begin April second.

Whatever tariffs other nations set on our products, we'll set matching tariffs on their products. That's kinda cute, in a way. More complicated than it sounds, I think, because we don't buy the same products from them that they buy from us. But it is cute. And it might be a way for Trump to negotiate the tariff rates to lower and lower levels over time. I think that might be what he has in mind.

Well, the speech went on for a while longer. He started introducing people from the audience and I started losing interest. But I waited it out to the end. And while I did, I wrote this in my notes:

Trump's plan for the economy seems to be tariffs, tariffs, and tariffs.

I didn't hear him say anything about finishing his first-term project, the wall between the US and Mexico to keep foreigners out. His second-term focus is evidently on another wall, a different wall, a wall of tariffs intended to keep foreign output out. 

I oppose globalization, but I don't think tariffs are a good idea. I think the good idea would be to figure out why US economic growth is in long term decline, and solve that problem, the problem of excessive private-sector debt.

Tuesday, March 4, 2025

The January jump in employment looks suspicious


The Employment Level increased far more in January 2025 than in any month since January 2021 -- far more than in any month of the Biden administration, we might say:

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1E8kq

Despite all the sudden change in the first weeks of the Trump administration, despite all of the unknowns arising from the threat of 25 percent tariffs, despite the decline of employment due to the federal workforce reductions of Musk and DOGE, despite the warning from the CEO of Alcoa that

the tariffs could cost about 20,000 US aluminum industry jobs and a further 80,000 jobs in sectors that support it.
"This is bad for the aluminum industry in the US, it's bad for American workers," he said.

In addition, according to Google's AI Overview,

Ford CEO Jim Farley has warned that tariffs on Mexico and Canada would be devastating for the U.S. auto industry.

Reuters adds

"What we're seeing is a lot of cost, a lot of chaos," Farley said on Tuesday at a Wolfe Research conference. 

None of this news, none of these views, are good for the economy. Furthermore, I don't see it in the data, but CBS News reports that "Consumer confidence plunged in February amid rising economic concerns". Expectations, when they are falling, can undermine even a good economy.

And even Trump supporters see a rough spot in the road ahead. According to VOX (November 1, 2024):

If elected, Trump has vowed to put Musk in charge of a “government efficiency commission,” which would identify supposedly wasteful programs that should be eliminated or slashed. During a telephone town hall last Friday, Musk said his commission’s work would “necessarily involve some temporary hardship.”

"Temporary hardship."

Days later, Musk suggested that this budget cutting — combined with Trump’s mass deportation plan — would cause a market-crashing economic “storm.”

"A market-crashing economic storm."

On his social media platform, X (a.k.a. Twitter), an anonymous user posted Tuesday that, “If Trump succeeds in forcing through mass deportations, combined with Elon hacking away at the government, firing people and reducing the deficit - there will be an initial severe overreaction in the economy…Market will tumble. But when the storm passes and everyone realizes we are on sounder footing, there will be a rapid recovery to a healthier, sustainable economy.”

A severe overreaction downward -- but one that I say will not be an over-reaction. The anonymous user's references to sounder footing, rapid recovery, and a healthier, sustainable economy are conclusions that I, for one, am unable to reach. Optimism these days is a dangerous thing.

Musk replied, “Sounds about right.”

Musk is excessively optimistic.

Many people seem to think that you can do whatever you want, set whatever economic policy you want to set, and run with it, no problem. I don't think like that. I think persistent bad policy will always lead to a crisis and severe recession like we had in 2008-09 and for some time after. And I think a severe recession can become a depression, and a severe depression can become a Dark Age.

I think this is serious business, and our policymakers need to think long and hard and clearly and carefully about what they are doing. I understand, that if and when a Dark Age comes, it will be the wealthy few who are left owning everything. I understand that these owners of "provinces" will become the leaders of the new governments that arise in those provinces. I even understand that the wealthy few may look forward to such developments, though I do not. Most people seem not to think about such things. 

Most people seem not to realize that it is possible to prevent such developments by correctly understanding the problems of our economy -- that is to say, not the surface problems that people have with the economy, but the deeper imbalances that disturb our economy and are never addressed -- and by correctly addressing those imbalances.

It should be clear that the policymakers who allowed the troubles of 2008-09 to develop and come to fruition were not able to understand the imbalances that disturbed our economy, nor properly address them. Far as I can tell, the Trump team is even further than that from the economic thinking they need. The Trump team seems to have a "set whatever economic policy you want" mindset, and is nowhere near correctly understanding the imbalances that disturb our economy.

 

Musk said we should expect some "temporary" hardship. Yeah, and the last guy to use the word "temporary" in a context like that was Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell in March 2021, when he said we should expect some "temporary" inflation.


The pandemic recovery aside, the employment level increased more in January 2025 than at any time since January 2000. I don't believe the January 2025 number. I think Trump went with the fake news.