The reduction in inflation that occurred in the early 1980s, when the Federal Reserve was headed by Paul Volcker, is arguably the most widely discussed and visible macroeconomic event of the last 50 years of U.S. history.- Goodfriend and King, 2005
But that disinflation is ignored in discussions of the Debt-to-GDP ratio.- Arthurian
The first graph here shows nonfinancial debt relative to Gross Domestic Product:
Graph #1: TCMDODNS / GDPA at FRED |
Economists dwell on the remarkable stability of this ratio before 1981, and focus on the sudden sharp increase after 1981:
- "The
combined indebtedness of both government and private-sector borrowers,
which earlier had shown considerable stability in relation to the
economy's overall growth, and especially so since World War II, has
since 1980 jumped far out of proportion with nonfinancial economic
activity." (B. Friedman 1986, p.1)
- "One clear limitation
of our dataset is that it starts in 1980. It is sufficient, however, to
look back at the history of the United States (for which long back data
are easily available) to understand how extraordinary the developments
over the last 30 years have been. As Graph 2 [here, Graph #1] shows, the
US non-financial debt-to-GDP ratio was steady at around 150% [here,
140% and until the early 1980s] from the early 1950s until the mid-1980s." (Cecchetti et al 2011, p.6)
- "When
did financialization start? While there is much literature on the
increasing dominance of finance in the United States after 1970, ...
most analysts emphasize the neoliberal period beginning in the 1980s."
(Fasianos et al 2016, p.2)
What caused the sharp increase in the Debt-to-GDP ratio in the 1980s? Financialization was not the cause. Financialization did not emerge fully formed from the void in 1981. The sudden increase in the ratio happened when Paul Volcker's anti-inflation policy started working. The next graph shows growth rates for debt and GDP, separately, using the same source data as the first graph:
Graph #2: Companion Graph Showing the FRED data TCMDODNS and GDPA |
Growth is shown for moving 20-year periods. The first value of each line, plotted at 1966, indicates the rate of growth of the 1946-1966 period. The second value indicates the 1947-1967 period, etc.
GDP and
nonfinancial debt run close from 1966 to 1981 -- essentially from 1946
to 1981 -- and incredibly close from 1974 to 1981. This confirms the
standard evaluation of the standard Debt-to-GDP graph: stability before the 1980s.
But the lines separate after 1981, just as the Debt-to-GDP ratio rises. This is not because of any significant change in the path of debt. Graph #2 shows little change in the path of debt. Nor do the lines separate because of any significant change in the growth of Real GDP:
Graph #3: Showing FRED data TCMDODNS, GDPA, and GDPCA |
The separation after 1981 can only have been due to a change in the path of the price level, as the price level is the only difference between real and nominal GDP. I am therefore forced to conclude that the sudden, sharp increase in Debt-to-GDP after 1981, visible on the first graph, was a direct consequence of the Volcker disinflation.
The price level caused debt and GDP to run together until Volcker, and then the price level caused debt and GDP to diverge.
The sudden increase in the
Debt-to-GDP ratio in the 1980s was the result of anti-inflation policy.
It was not the result of financialization emerging suddenly, like an evil
butterfly escaping an innocuous cocoon.
The Debt-to-GDP graph shows the path of debt, but shows it relative to GDP. The companion graph shows the path of debt and the path of GDP, and shows them separately so that they may be evaluated and compared.
The essential point is that the
growth of debt was rapid, persistent, and (as the vertical axis values
show) accelerating without hesitation from the early days until 1986. There was no sharp change in debt growth until after the rise in Debt-to-GDP -- and the change, when it came, was decrease. The problem with debt is not the increase since 1981, but the increase since the end of the second World War.
The logic that says rapid growth of debt is okay until debt becomes a problem is the logic that creates the problem.
It was inflation that kept the ratio low. It was the Great Inflation that kept the Debt-to-GDP ratio low from the mid-60s to the Volcker disinflation. Without the Great Inflation, the ratio would have looked more like this:
Graph #4: Inflation messes with the debt-to-GDP ratio |
As Investopedia says, "the beginnings of financialization in the United States can be traced as far back as the 1950s".
Data
Debt: quarterly by default, set to annual frequency and end-of-period aggregation
Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors; Debt Securities and Loans; Liability, Level (TCMDODNS)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TCMDODNS
NGDP: annual by default
Gross Domestic Product (GDPA)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA
RGDP: annual by default
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPCA)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPCA
Price Level: annual by default
Gross domestic product (implicit price deflator) (A191RD3A086NBEA)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A191RD3A086NBEA
Growth calculation: (At / At-20) - 1
where A is annual data from FRED, as specified.
References
Cecchetti, S., Mohanty, M. and Zampolli, F. (2011): “The real effects of debt”, BIS Working Papers no. 352, September.
https://www.bis.org/publ/work352.pdf
Fasianos,
A., Guevara, D., and Pierros, C. (2016): ‟Have We Been Here Before?
Phases of Financialization within the 20th Century in the United
States”, Levy Economics Institute working paper no. 869, June.
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_869.pdf
FRED https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
Friedman,
B. (1986): “Increasing Indebtedness and Financial Stability in the
United States”, NBER Working Papers, no 2072, November.
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w2072/w2072.pdf
Goodfriend, M., King, R. (2005): ‟The incredible Volcker disinflation”. Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (2005) 981–1015.
https://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2011/01/GKcr2005.pdf
Investopedia (2021): ‟Financialization”.
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialization.asp
This paper online:
https://econcrit.blogspot.com/2021/10/debt-to-gdp-companion-graph.html
3 comments:
I know one guy who thinks fighting inflation (thus reducing nominal GDP) should lead to an increase in the Debt-to-GDP ratio. But he sees this increase as "more correlation than causation".
I have some trouble with that view.
I know another guy who considered my argument that the 1981-1986 rise in the Debt-to-GPD ratio was caused by Volcker ending the Great Inflation. But he couldn't make the connection. He sees "a break in the behavior" of the ratio, attributable somehow to other factors.
What, and "the most widely discussed and visible macroeconomic event of the last 50 years" had no effect?
Summary of my argument:
1. You can see on Graph #1 that there was a change in the Debt-to-GDP ratio in the first half of the 1980s.
2. You can see on Graph #2 that there is NO change in debt growth that could account for the change on Graph #1. However, there IS a change in nominal GDP growth that could account for it.
3. You can see on Graph #3 that there was NO change in the Real GDP component of nominal GDP that could account for the change on Graph #1. Therefore, the change on Graph #1 MUST BE due to the Price Level component of nominal GDP, as this is the only other component.
Benjamin Friedman, WP 2072, p.23:
"In time, of course, a sufficient amount of price inflation can also restore the debt ratio to its historical range, just as could sustained real growth."
The relation between inflation and the Debt-to-GDP ratio did not escape Friedman's notice. But no one seems to have picked up the idea that it was the Volcker Disinflation that increased the ratio from 1.39 in 1981 to 1.85 in 1987.
Current FRED data for nonfinancial debt has the debt-to-GDP ratio now at 2.93.
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