Saturday, April 10, 2021

Household debt: An Alternative to the Wikipedia View

All of the Wikipedia references in this essay have been taken from the "Household debt" article on the evening of 9 April 2021.

 The opening statement:

Household debt is defined as the combined debt of all people in a household. It includes consumer debt and mortgage loans. A significant rise in the level of this debt coincides historically with many severe economic crises and was a cause of the U.S. and subsequent European economic crises of 2007–2012. Several economists have argued that lowering this debt is essential to economic recovery in the U.S. and selected Eurozone countries.

"A significant rise in the level of this debt" -- household debt, as opposed to government debt, nonfinancial business debt, and financial business debt -- "coincides historically with many severe economic crises..."

I am particularly uncomfortable with the view that household debt is the problem. Such analysis is, at the very least, oversimplified.

 

Under Historical perspective:

In the 20th century, spending on consumer durables rose significantly... Easy credit encouraged a shift from saving to spending.

No. Policy encouraged the shift from saving to spending; easy credit was only one aspect of policy.


Under Global economic impact:

"Household debt soared in the years leading up to the Great Recession. In advanced economies, during the five years preceding 2007, the ratio of household debt to income rose by an average of 39 percentage points, to 138 percent...

Yeah, okay. I don't know the specific percentages, but rapid debt increase leading up to 2007 is right. On the other hand, it is wrong to grab one fact and start drawing conclusions. Just as the financial crisis and Great Recession were consequences of massive, rapidly growing household debt, so too was the massive and growing household debt a consequence of that which came before.

We cannot wait until the shit hits the fan and then say Now there's the problem! We must not wait until it is too late. If accumulating debt leads to accumulating disaster, the time to act is not at the first evidence of disaster but at the first indication that growing debt is starting to slow the economy. Not in 2007, in other words, but in 1967.


Under U.S. economic impact

The policy prescription of Ms Yellen's predecessor Mr Bernanke was to increase the money supply and artificially reduce interest rates. This stoked another debt and asset bubble.

Note carefully that those sentences attribute both the solution and the problem to the central bank.

The central bank operates in an economic environment created largely by the U.S. Congress. The U.S. tax code for many many years, by allowing the tax deduction for interest paid, encouraged people to go into debt and to remain in debt. Only when debt had grown to the point that it was creating problems did Congress begin to eliminate the tax deduction. It was half-hearted. It was ill-conceived. And it came too late.

Eliminating the tax deduction at a time when debt was already creating problems only made the problems more severe. You would have had to eliminate the deduction by the early 1960s to beat the clock on this, and the fact that you don't believe that is part of the reason it didn't happen.

In any event it would have been better to replace the tax deduction for interest paid with a tax credit that reduces our tax payments when we pay down our debt ahead of schedule. Such a policy could be designed to create the same tax advantage for the taxpayer, while improving macroeconomic conditions by reducing our debt.


And this:

Economists Atif Mian and Amir Sufi wrote in 2014 that:

  • Historically, severe economic downturns are almost always preceded by a sharp increase in household debt.

Again, we don't want to wait until the severe economic downturn is right on top of us.

And again, looking only at household debt gives us an incomplete picture. Here is household debt as a percent of GDP:

Graph #1: Household Debt as Percent of GDP

On the first graph, household debt appears to reach a horrifying high just in time to cause the Great Recession. But now look at that same household debt as a percent of All Sectors debt:

Graph #2: Household Debt as Percent of All Sectors Debt

Relative to the big debt number, household debt reaches its lowest peak just before the Great Recession. High peaks occurred in the mid-1960s when the economy was still good, but on the cusp, and in 1980 when the economy was already slowing due to excessive debt.

Look only at household debt and household debt looks like the biggest problem in the world. Compare household debt to all the debt, and you know in your bones that the problem does not lie in one piece of our massive accumulation of debt, but in the whole of it.


Under Effects on economic growth they quote Ezra Klein:

The utility of calling this downturn a “household-debt crisis” is it tells you where to put your focus: you either need to make consumers better able to pay their debts, which you can do through conventional stimulus policy like tax cuts and jobs programs, or you need to make their debts smaller ...

Number one: IT CANNOT BE DONE THROUGH CONVENTIONAL POLICY. Conventional policy is based on two notions, one true, one false:

  • using credit is good for growth; and 
  • the resulting debt does no harm.

The problem will not be solved by conventional policy until the conventions change. 

And remember, if the problem is debt, look at the whole problem, not just part of it. And when the problem is big enough to grab everyone's attention, the economy is telling you the problem has been growing worse for a very long time.

3 comments:

jim said...

If you want to examine household liabilities leading up to the 2008 meltdown, you should also look at the lending source of those liabilities. In the years before the meltdown private investors funded $6 trillion into US residential mortgages. Those mortgages were almost all designed to be paid back quickly. Investots made money by effectively compelling the borrowers to pay back the loan in a short amount of time. The borrowers were given loans that required no documentation of income or evidence of ability to pay, no money down and low or zero monthly payments. The catch was they had to sell the house or refinance before the teaser rates expired after 12-24 mos. The effect of this was to drive house prices sky high. I know of one house that the record of deeds shows the house was sold 23 times in the years 1998-2007 and the price from the first sale to the last went up by almost a factor of ten.

In the graph(link below)it shows what Household debt would be minus the mortgage debt financed by private mortgage conduits (the main source of private investment financing). But even that blue curve doesn't capture the enormity of the household debt that was created by funding home sales that banks would never fund. The huge inflation in house prices that was created by stuffing $6 trillion into a $3 trillion housing market also impacted the conventional borrowers that put their 20% down and made their regular installment payments out of their income over 30 years. The green dashed line shows where household debt might have gone were it not for the legalization of Ponzi lending to households in the 1980s. That includes the legalization of loan sharking with exorbitant interst rates.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=D1el

The Arthurian said...

Under "Historical Perspective" above, I quoted and modified the Wikipedia statement. I said:
"Policy encouraged the shift from saving to spending; easy credit was only one aspect of policy."
I changed their "easy credit" to "policy" and left the rest alone. But I'm also not happy with "the shift from saving to spending". That is NOT an accurate description of the problem. It's not even what happened.

The problem is not a shift from saving to spending.

The problem is that we use credit for money. More and more of the spending we do is financed: we have to pay interest on it, and we have to pay back what we borrowed. The policy that made this happen is the problem. And the thinking that created that policy is the underlying problem.

The Arthurian said...

I said: "But I'm also not happy with 'the shift from saving to spending'. That is NOT an accurate description of the problem. It's not even what happened."

From FRED's notes on M2SL:
"Before May 2020, M2 consists of M1 plus (1) savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts); (2) small-denomination time deposits ...; and (3) balances in retail money market funds (MMFs) ...

From Investopedia:
"Time deposits generally pay a slightly higher rate of interest than a regular savings account."

From Investopedia:
"Most money market [deposit] accounts pay a higher interest rate than regular passbook savings accounts and ... come with restrictions that make them less flexible than a regular checking account."

From Forbes:
"A money market mutual fund—often referred to as a money market fund—is a low-risk investment vehicle that provides both a modest return on your money and a high degree of liquidity... Money market mutual funds were first developed in the 1970s before bank money market accounts came on the scene, as an alternative to low-yielding savings accounts."

Thus, before May 2020, M2 consisted of M1 plus several types of savings. The Fed evidently thought money market mutual funds were similar enough to savings accounts to be included in M2 along with the others.

In short: M2 includes M1 plus savings.

Now go to FRED and look at M2 relative to M1. The ratio starts in 1959 at just over 2:
(1) M1 + (1) savings = 2 = M2

By the mid-1980s the ratio is 4:
(1) M1 + (3) savings = 4 = M2

By 2008 the ratio reaches 5.5:
(1) M1 + (4.5) savings = 5.5 = M2

Savings increased far more than M1. Note that M1 started out as the money we spend. Thus savings increased far more than spending-money did. THERE WAS NO SHIFT FROM SAVINGS TO SPENDING. The growth of savings was a result of financial innovation, and it was encouraged by policy and deregulation.

Note that twice on the graph, when savings goes high there is financial crisis. ENCOURAGING MORE SAVINGS IS NOT THE SOLUTION. IT IS THE PROBLEM.

At the far right on the graph the line goes straight down (in April or May of 2020) due to a revision of Fed regulations. THE FED IS TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF TOO-MUCH-SAVINGS by the ridiculous and desperate measure of re-defining several measures of savings accounts as transaction accounts so they can be included in M1.