Sunday, November 29, 2020

Not "interest only"

My concern with the growth of finance as a cause of slow economic growth goes back to the cost-push inflation of the 1970s. That inflation was often attributed to rising wages or the rising price of oil. But I think it had its roots in the rising cost of finance, roots that go back further, at least to the 1950s.

A continuing-cost problem will result in either slowing growth or cost-push inflation, or some combination of the two, depending on the level of "accommodation" provided by economic policy. If they print money you get inflation. If they don't, you get slowing growth.

Many people say inflation is always demand-pull and never cost-push. They say inflation is always caused by printing money. They say the inflation of the 1970s was caused by accommodative policy, which dealt with rising cost by increasing the quantity of money. I say that when the accommodative policy is a response to rising cost that would otherwise have caused unacceptably slow growth, the inflation is caused by the cost-push pressure.

I agree with the demand-pull view to this extent: We cannot have inflation unless the quantity of money increases enough to support spending at the higher price level. However, the focus of that view is only on inflation, as if the pressure of rising cost has no impact on economic growth. In these days of persistently slow growth, that view is painfully incomplete.

I don't imagine that I'm the first person ever to identify rising financial cost as the source of the cost pressure that forces us to choose between inflation and slowing growth. So I went looking for studies and statements where other people have expressed a view like mine. I came upon The Interest Cost-Push Controversy (PDF, 8 pages) by Thomas M. Humphrey. It sounded promising.

Humphrey's paper describes a controversy between Thomas Tooke and Knut Wicksell regarding the cause of inflation. Tooke said high interest rates add more to the cost of output than do low interest rates, so high interest rates are inflationary. In response, Wicksell developed a whole theory. Today, Wicksell's thinking is embedded in our thinking. When I said above that we cannot have inflation unless the quantity of money increases enough to support spending at the higher price level, that's Wicksell. I didn't know.

Humphrey writes:

The Tooke-Wicksell controversy is important not only because it produced the first clear statement of the interest cost-push doctrine as well as the first rigorous and systematic attempt to disprove it, but also because it helped establish the case for tight money and because it introduced the prototype of the analytical macroeconomic model that most monetary authorities use today in designing anti-inflationary monetary policies.

I found the Wicksell stuff fascinating.

Thomas Tooke's argument, as presented by Humphrey at least, was disappointing. It is not about financial cost. It is only about the cost difference arising from a change in interest rates. The "so-called interest cost-push school," Humphrey writes, "... insists that higher interest rates are inherently inflationary because they raise the interest component of business costs".

Thomas Tooke, Humphrey says,

author of the monumental six volume History of Prices (1838-57), and foremost collector of price and monetary data in the 19th century, had advanced the interest cost-push argument that high interest rates cause high prices and low rates low prices.

Tooke's focus was the effect on prices of high versus low interest rates. Nothing else. Interest only. The difference in cost attributable to a change in interest rates.

Focusing solely on the cost aspects of interest and ignoring the influence on prices of interest-induced increases in borrowing, lending, the money stock, and spending, he asserted that a reduced loan rate “has no . . . tendency to raise the prices of commodities...”

The whole "interest cost-push" argument is based on the cost of interest being greater when interest rates are higher. I was looking for an argument about the cost of finance, not just the rate of interest. In this respect, the article was a disappointment.

It seems to me that Thomas Tooke considered his topic from a static microeconomic perspective, evaluating the cost of a loan at two different rates of interest. From a macroeconomic perspective, one would want to consider also whether the total number of loans increased over time, and the aggregate cost difference between the larger and smaller accumulations of debt.

If the rate of interest is constant while the accumulation of debt doubles relative to GDP, the cost of interest doubles, relative to GDP.

If the financial sector of the economy grows faster than GDP, it creates a continuing-cost problem for all other sectors of the economy. Depending on the level of accommodation by the Fed, the result is inflation, or slow growth, or both. This result will continue as long as finance continues growing faster than GDP.

And now you know how we got to where we are today.

Thursday, November 26, 2020

Shares of GDI and the Great Inflation

Allan Meltzer dates the Great Inflation as the period from 1965 to 1984:

https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/05/03/part2/Meltzer.pdf


Compensation of Employees as a percent of Gross Domestic Income:

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A4002E1A156NBEA

Click the links below to highlight the graph:

1966 to 1970 may be the wage-push part of the Great Inflation. The increase suggests it.

1971 to 1985 certainly is not wage-push. The downtrend denies the possibility.

Come to think of it, 1954 to 1965 doesn't show a wage-push increase, either. Again, there is no trend of increase in employee compensation as a share of Gross Domestic Income. But something was driving prices up. In those years we find a worrisome warning of the Great Inflation to come: the creeping inflation of 1955-1958. Samuelson and Solow wrote of it in 1960:

This emphasis on demand-pull was somewhat reinforced by the Korean war run-up of prices after mid-1950. But just by the time that cost-push was becoming discredited as a theory of inflation, we ran into the rather puzzling phenomenon of the 1955-58 upward creep of prices, which seemed to take place in the last part of the period despite growing overcapacity, slack labor markets, slow real growth, and no apparent great buoyancy in overall demand.

If inflation was rising because wages were leading the way, wouldn't demand have been buoyant?

Everywhere you look, people say cost-push inflation was due to the rising cost of oil or the rising cost of labor. But that's in recent decades. In the 1950s and '60s, before oil became a problem, everybody blamed the cost of labor. The bleedin' obvious, Basil Fawlty would say.

Obvious, yes, but not the right answer.

The growing cost of finance in the 1950s was the spark that was to create the raging fire we call the Great Inflation. 

But these days, not so much the inflation. These days, finance hinders growth instead, because the Fed is less willing to "accommodate" the cost pressure. And again, let me add that because the cost of finance creates continuing cost pressure throughout the economy, the "hindering" of economic growth has become long-term economic decline.

Tuesday, November 24, 2020

A picture is worth a thousand words

Graph #1: Profit as Percent of Gross Value Added, for Financial Corporate Business (red)
Profit as Percent of Gross Value Added, for Nonfinancial Corporate Business (blue)

Monday, November 23, 2020

Are you ready for the end of the Brexit transition?

 

Found this site while looking for stagflation data for 1965...

https://www.gov.uk/transition

 

Been up for a while now, apparently. I didn't know they were doing anything. 

They made a web page.

A few highlights:



 


But why are they calling it the "end" of the transition, now that they're ready to start? It seems to me like a subtle admission it's doomed to fail.


Sunday, November 22, 2020

They think like bankers, that's the problem

I focus on cost, the cost of credit versus the cost of money. If you want to use credit, you're gonna have to pay interest on the money you borrow. If you want to use money, you may have to work to get it, but once you have it, you have it and you don't have to pay interest on it.

I distinguish credit from money by whether or not you have to pay interest on it. Some people reject this idea, but there is no thought more important in our economy: Credit is money we have borrowed.

And what is debt? Debt is the money we pay interest on. Debt is the amount of money we have borrowed and not yet repaid. Debt is the measure of credit in use.

Suppose the interest rate is 3%.

Suppose credit-in-use in the US is about 3¾ times the size of the quantity of money. That means, for every dollar of money, we're paying about 11 cents in interest charges. This was the situation in 1946.

Suppose credit in use in the US is about 38 times the size of the quantity of money. At an interest rate of 3%, for every dollar of money, we're paying about $1.14 in interest charges. This was the situation in 2007 (except the interest rate was like 5% in 2007).

The average cost of interest per dollar in 1946 was 11 cents. The average cost of interest per dollar in 2007 was more than a dollar more than 11 cents. (And that's assuming an interest rate of 3%.)

That's why I distinguish between money and credit: So I can see this cost.

If you say "this is the result of economic policy" then I say yes, you are absolutely right. But I will also say policymakers have it wrong. I don't think they look at "the average cost of interest per dollar of money" at all. How else could they let interest cost increase so much? How else could they fail to notice that the high cost of interest is a problem?

They think like bankers, that's how. For them, more borrowing means more business. That kind of thinking creates problems for the economy.

Policymakers think using credit is good for economic growth. It is. But debt's a killer. Using credit creates debt, and the debt's a killer.

By the way, using money does not create debt. But you knew that.

Policymakers think using credit is good for economic growth. So they create policies that make it easier for us to use credit. Okay, but using credit creates debt. Our debt increases because of their policies. And policymakers don't create policies to help us reduce our debt. 

Take the tax deduction for mortgage interest, for example. You don't pay tax on the interest you pay. This is to encourage people to get mortgages. And wouldn't you know it, when the financial crisis arose, 2007-2008, mortgage debt was the big part of the problem.

We should scrap the tax deduction for mortgage interest, and replace it with a different policy that creates an equivalent tax break for homeowners. Instead of getting a tax break for paying interest, we should be getting a tax break for making extra payments on the mortgage. Instead of getting a tax break for having a mortgage, you'd be getting a tax break for paying it off early.

When you take out a loan, you get the money along with an obligation to pay it back, with interest. That's what credit is: money, plus the obligation to pay it back. 

If I borrow a dollar and spend it, I'm spending credit. But only the "money" part of the credit changes hands. The obligation to pay it back stays with me. The "debt" part of credit stays with the borrower. The "money" part of credit is the part that changes hands when we spend it. And the person who receives it receives money, not credit, because she didn't borrow it. I did. (Read that again.)

There is a problem with paying debt back early. If policymakers change the tax deduction so it encourages us to pay off our debt early, by making those payments we will be reducing the quantity of money in the economy. This undermines the whole concept of using credit: Using credit doesn't help the economy grow if we pay back the money too soon. When we pay it back, it's not in the economy anymore, being spent. That's the problem with paying debt back early.

There is a simple solution. Let the Fed keep an eye on the "average cost of interest per dollar". Let them increase the quantity of money -- that's money, not credit -- in the economy, increase it enough to offset the effect of us paying back our debt early. One way to do it? Let our paychecks grow a little faster. It's not rocket science.

By the way, the money I'm talking about is the money that changes hands. M1 money. That's the money we receive as income, the money we spend, the money that's "readily accessible for spending".

But maybe you don't like the idea of letting our paychecks grow a little faster. I admire your altruism. And you are right: We have to prevent the inflation that might be induced by rising pay. No problem.

Instead of suppressing the increase of money, policy should be suppressing the increase of credit. We went over this already. Tax breaks for home mortgages have to change. Tax breaks for business use of credit have to change. The "bankers' mindset" of policymakers has to change: Stop encouraging the growth of finance!

If we do it right, the increased growth of money is offset by decreased growth of credit-use, so our improving paychecks create no inflationary pressure. At the same time, the increase of money and the decrease of credit-use reduces the average cost of interest per dollar. It reduces the cost of finance. It relieves the cost pressure created by the rising cost of finance.

And you know what? Relieving the cost pressure created by finance improves living standards, lifts profits and improves economic growth.

Let us begin.