From the Foreword in the second edition (1979) of Carroll Quigley's The Evolution of Civilizations:
Quigley perceives—correctly in my view—the possible termination of open-ended Western civilization. With access to an explosive technology that can tear the planet apart, coupled with the failure of Western civilization to establish any viable system of world government, local political authority will tend to become violent and absolutist. As we move into irrational activism, states will seize upon ideologies that justify absolutism. The 2,000-year separation in Western history of state and society would then end. Western people would rejoin those of the rest of the world in merging the two into a single entity, authoritarian and static. The age that we are about to enter would be an ideologic one consistent with the views of Hegel and Marx—a homeostatic condition. That triumph would end the Western experiment and return us to the experience of the rest of the world—namely, that history is a sequence of stages in the rise and fall of absolutist ideologies.
I don't know anything about the "2,000-year separation in Western history of state and society". I don't know what is meant by an "ideologic" age "consistent with the views of Hegel and Marx—a homeostatic condition." But I did look up "homeostatic"; it refers to "a stable internal environment". To me, that means little or no economic growth and little or no technological advance.
- "an explosive technology that can tear the planet apart, coupled with the failure of Western civilization to establish any viable system of world government"
- "political authority will tend to become violent and absolutist"
- "states will seize upon ideologies that justify absolutism"
- "Western people [will] rejoin those of the rest of the world in merging [state and society] into a single entity, authoritarian and static."
But I have to focus on "the failure of Western civilization to establish any viable system of world government". I'm not sure we want that. I know, Star Trek was big on unified world government. But I don't think we are ready for it. And I don't expect things to go smoothly if Trump tries to unify the northern half of the western hemisphere.
I can easily picture Trump as a new Caesar, trying to assemble an empire. But his view seems to be that treating other nations as equals is a sign of weakness, and that tough talk is a sign of strength. My view is that a strong economy is evidence of strength, and a weak economy is evidence of weakness. I think the US would be at a disadvantage in a serious military confrontation.
There is an alternative: We can figure out the problem, and fix our economy. The trouble with that is, we would have to admit that some of our economic policies are wrong because some of our economic thinking is wrong. And that is a hard nut to crack.
Well, civilizations die from suicide. So it is our choice. But if we figure out the problem and fix our economy, then maybe we will be ready to lead a global government.
Or maybe we won't need one. If we fix the economy, and fix it right, maybe we won't need global government.
In Chapter 24, section IV of The General Theory, Keynes envisioned an alternative:
I have pointed out in the preceding chapter that, under the system of domestic laissez-faire and an international gold standard such as was orthodox in the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was no means open to a government whereby to mitigate economic distress at home except through the competitive struggle for markets. For all measures helpful to a state of chronic or intermittent under-employment were ruled out, except measures to improve the balance of trade on income account.
Thus, whilst economists were accustomed to applaud the prevailing international system as furnishing the fruits of the international division of labour and harmonising at the same time the interests of different nations, there lay concealed a less benign influence; and those statesmen were moved by common sense and a correct apprehension of the true course of events, who believed that if a rich, old country were to neglect the struggle for markets its prosperity would droop and fail. But if nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment by their domestic policy (and, we must add, if they can also attain equilibrium in the trend of their population), there need be no important economic forces calculated to set the interest of one country against that of its neighbours.
There would still be room for the international division of labour and for international lending in appropriate conditions. But there would no longer be a pressing motive why one country need force its wares on another or repulse the offerings of its neighbour, not because this was necessary to enable it to pay for what it wished to purchase, but with the express object of upsetting the equilibrium of payments so as to develop a balance of trade in its own favour. International trade would cease to be what it is, namely, a desperate expedient to maintain employment at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting purchases, which, if successful, will merely shift the problem of unemployment to the neighbour which is worsted in the struggle, but a willing and unimpeded exchange of goods and services in conditions of mutual advantage.
If we fix the economy and fix it wrong, global government will not help. There will be some economic turmoil for a while, turmoil that is mistaken for vigor, but it will fade. And we will move gradually from the rise to the fall of our global state, in the footsteps of Rome. Perhaps more quickly than Rome.
In the meanwhile, our global government may be called America, but it will not be America.
The Cycle of Civilization is an economic cycle, as is the familiar business cycle. But the Cycle of Civ is driven by the growth and spread of wealth during the rise-to-peak, and by the decline of growth and the concentration of wealth during the fall-from-peak.
Ancient Rome of legend was a land of small farmers. Ancient Rome approaching the fall was a land of latifundia -- farms the size of Roman provinces -- for the wealthy; and of "bread and circuses" in Rome, for the displaced poor that had once been farmers.
The cycle, driven in its latter stages by the power of great wealth, progresses by means of policy changes that promote further and faster concentration of wealth while fewer and fewer wealth-holders remain, leaving the rest of us with less and less of the medium of exchange, and therefore less ability to participate in economic transactions.
The object of business is to be successful. Success is measured by revenue size. If the most successful among us are permitted (and even encouraged by policy) to continue this game, the less successful are left to choose between moving to Byzantium while there is still time, or joining the unemployed farmers for bread and circuses.
Eventually the quantity of money in the hands of the masses is not enough to sustain economic activity, and the monetary economy fades away. Eventually a land-based manorial system emerges. When order is sufficiently restored, after centuries perhaps, monetary economy gradually re-emerges.
This is the world that awaits us if we continue to honor the "property is sacred" mantra. Oh! We do not have to abandon it! That would be worse. All we need is to put a cap on it, an upper limit. That could be done simply by changing our tax system.
We also need to weaken the many economic policies that encourage the use of credit, and those that encourage the provision of credit.
And I would argue that as we come to use less credit, we will have to increase the quantity of money enough to compensate for the decrease of credit use -- and we should increase wages to get that money into the economy. Note that the decline in credit use offsets the inflationary pressure of the Q-of-M increase, and that credit-avoidance reduces financial cost and leaves more of our Personal Income available for spending if we so choose -- all as the result of a policy-driven mechanism. At the same time, less credit-use in business reduces business interest costs, leaving more revenue available to increase both wages and profits.
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