A timeline of thinking about debt

From 1934, from John Maynard Keynes, ref The Essential Keynes:

I see the problem of recovery, accordingly, in the following light: How soon will normal business enterprise come to the rescue? What measures can be taken to hasten the return of normal enterprise? On what scale, by which expedients and for how long is abnormal government expenditure advisable in the meantime?

From 1937, from Yglesias, ref DeLong:

Back in 1937, John Maynard Keynes warned Franklin Roosevelt that “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.”

From 1949, from the "Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report":

The first inescapable principle of successful [federal] debt management is successful maintenance of high levels of national income... The servicing and retirement of private indebtedness likewise will be impossible unless national income remains high. It, too, should be paid off as much as possible in boom years.

And then something changed.

From 1965, from Time Magazine via Brad DeLong, on repayment of debt:

Nor, in perhaps the greatest change of all, do [businessmen] believe that Government will ever fully pay off its debt, any more than General Motors or IBM find it advisable to pay off their long-term obligations; instead of demanding payment, creditors would rather continue collecting interest.

From the 1975 edition of Campbell McConnell's Economics, pp. 280-281:

Although the size and growth of public debt are looked upon with awe and alarm, private debt has grown much faster. Private and public debt were of about equal size in 1947. But private debt has grown much faster and is now over three times as large -- about $1,350 billion, compared with $470 billion -- as the public debt.

If you insist upon worrying about debt, you will do well to concern yourself with private rather than public indebtedness.

 

From 1981, from Benjamin Friedman:

This paper documents a long-standing stability in the relationship between outstanding debt and economic activity in the United States...

From 1986, from Benjamin Friedman:

The U.S. economy's nonfinancial debt ratio has risen since 1980 to a level that is extraordinary in comparison with prior historical experience.

From 1995, from Elba K. Brown-Collier and Bruce E. Collier:

The policies pursued in the United States over the last forty years have not been consistent with Keynes' proposals for economic stabilization and have caused ever increasing deficits and financial instability.

 

From 2009, from Ben Bernanke in "The Crisis and the Policy Response":

Liquidity provision by the central bank reduces systemic risk by assuring market participants that, should short-term investors begin to lose confidence, financial institutions will be able to meet the resulting demands for cash without resorting to potentially destabilizing fire sales of assets.  Moreover, backstopping the liquidity needs of financial institutions reduces funding stresses and, all else equal, should increase the willingness of those institutions to lend and make markets.
...
By serving as a backup source of liquidity for borrowers, the Fed's commercial paper facility was aimed at reducing investor and borrower concerns about "rollover risk," the risk that a borrower could not raise new funds to repay maturing commercial paper.  The reduction of rollover risk, in turn, should increase the willingness of private investors to lend, particularly for terms longer than overnight.
...
In contrast, our forthcoming asset-backed securities program, a joint effort with the Treasury, is not purely for liquidity provision... If the program works as planned, it should lead to lower rates and greater availability of consumer and small business credit.  Over time, by increasing market liquidity and stimulating market activity, this facility should also help to revive private lending.
...
A continuing barrier to private investment in financial institutions is the large quantity of troubled, hard-to-value assets that remain on institutions' balance sheets.  The presence of these assets significantly increases uncertainty about the underlying value of these institutions and may inhibit both new private investment and new lending.

If that's not Excessive Reliance on Credit (EROC), nothing is.